Canadian democracy is under threat. Or so we have been told on repeated occasions over the past few years. Malign foreign actors are said to be spreading dangerous disinformation, interfering in elections, suborning members of Parliament, and generally meddling in a malicious fashion. According to the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, “The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has expanded its reach into virtually every corner of Canadian society.” And it’s not just the Chinese: Russia poses an equal threat and “the tentacles of [Russian] oligarchs and agents have also penetrated deep into Canadian business, politics, and society.” At least, that is the story.

Backing up these allegations are outlandish claims that there are traitors in Parliament, that one of Canada’s most respected journalists is a Russian agent, and the like. But is there anything to it? Judging by the report issued this week by the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions, led by Justice Marie-Josée Hogue, the answer is yes and no. Yes—there’s something to it, but no—it’s not nearly as significant as people make out.

On the one hand, the report reveals that there are some things happening on the fringes of our political system that could be classified as foreign interference. But on the other hand, it also demonstrates that their impact is decidedly limited and that the system itself remains “robust.” There are also some issues with how the government and its agencies deal with foreign interference allegations, including slow and partial dissemination of information to relevant parties. But these hardly amount to a threat to the foundations of our society.

The report doesn’t justify the image of Canada as riddled with foreign agents, proxies, and useful idiots. Rather, it paints a decidedly modest picture of the problem. And though it makes 51 policy recommendations, they are equally modest and amount to little more than bureaucratic tinkering around the edge of the issue. The commissioner recommends improving the dissemination of intelligence, giving opposition politicians security clearances, enhancing public awareness of the problem, and the like. Overall, it is all a bit underwhelming.

The only point at which the report abandons its rather measured tone is in a passage in the initial “Word from the Commissioner,” in which Justice Hogue states her opinion that disinformation is a far greater threat to Canada than electoral interference. Disinformation “poses the single biggest risk to our democracy. It is an existential threat,” she writes. This is a rather curious statement as the commission’s report devotes almost no attention to disinformation and contains nothing that would justify labelling the threat it poses as “existential.” It’s almost as if Justice Hogue is saying that the thing she was asked to investigate doesn’t amount to much but there’s something else out there that she thinks people should be looking at. It’s a bit odd.

Rather than disinformation, the main focus of the commission’s work, and the reason for its creation, is allegations of foreign interference in the 2019 and 2021 general elections. The commission also went beyond this and spent some time investigating the phenomenon of transnational repression. The report notes that members of diaspora communities have been subjected to “threats of physical and sexual violence, and even threats to life” as well as “harassment, exclusion and shunning of activists and dissidents within diaspora communities, attacks on reputations and defamatory campaigns.” That said, the report comments that “The Commission did not have the mandate to investigate [transnational repression] in the comprehensive and thoughtful way it requires.” This is perhaps a shame as it would appear that the impact on concrete individuals of such activities is far more serious than that of the commission’s main concern—electoral interference. It could be that we are focusing on the wrong thing.

On the matter of electoral interference, the report is decidedly cautious in its conclusions and recommendations. This has irritated some of those who wanted a more emphatic denunciation of foreign interference and a more aggressive response. For instance, Mehmet Tohti of the group Uyghur Advocacy accused the commission of “downplaying the impact of hostile interference in Canada,” which he claimed “undermines the gravity of the threat” and “also sends a dangerous message … that such activities can continue unchecked.” Meanwhile, the Ukrainian Canadian Congress called the report “disappointing,” complaining that “Nothing in Justice Hogue’s Report will give Russia any pause to cease any of its threatening activities.”

In fact, the underwhelming nature of the report is not a bad thing. It suggests a measured and reasonable assessment of the issue and a proportionate response. It is also in keeping with the evidence provided.

The commission examined a number of incidents of alleged foreign electoral interference in considerable detail, concluding that the primary foreign state trying to influence Canadian elections is the People’s Republic of China. The second most important is India. As for Russia, the report notes that “it appears to lack the intent” to interfere in Canadian elections and “Until now, the government has not observed Russian interference specific to democratic processes.”

The report’s main target is thus China, but even in that case the commission concludes that while there is some evidence of Chinese efforts to affect the selection of candidates and the outcome of the election in a few distinct ridings, “What can be said is that the number of ridings at issue is relatively small, and the ultimate effect of foreign interference on them remains uncertain.” Overall, “Although there are a very small number of isolated cases where foreign interference may have had some impact on the outcome of a nomination contest or the result of an election in a given riding, there is no evidence to suggest that our institutions have been seriously affected by such interference or that parliamentarians owe their successful election to foreign entities. While any attempted interference is troubling, I am reassured by the minimal impact such efforts have had to date.”

The conclusion that the impact of foreign interference is “minimal” is quite striking and makes one wonder whether the scale of threat justifies the amount of effort put into the inquiry and the amount of public time devoted to debating the issue. Justice Hogue’s response to this query is to say that while the interference itself has had almost no effect on elections, the debate about it has undermined public confidence in Canadian democracy. “This is perhaps the greatest harm Canada has suffered because of foreign interference and the public attention that it has now received,” she writes.

Here, I think, the report misses something important, namely that the real problem is less the interference itself than the somewhat hysterical reaction and threat inflation that has resulted from it. The issue has been thoroughly politicized by actors seeking to use it to discredit their political opponents and to promote hawkish policy responses. A prime example of this is the allegation that certain members of Parliament were working for foreign powers and are in effect “traitors.” Justice Hogue, however, dismisses the allegations, writing “Nor have I seen any evidence of ‘traitors’ in Parliament plotting with foreign states to act against Canada. Although a few cases involving things like attempts to curry favour with parliamentarians have come to light, the phenomenon remains marginal and largely ineffective.”

The conclusion that one can draw from this is that by helping discredit Canadian institutions, the false accusations and exaggerated claims that have been made about foreign interference appear to have done far more damage than the actual interference itself, whose impact was “limited,” “marginal” and “largely ineffective.” With luck the measured and reasonable tone of the Hogue report will bring some degree of reassurance, and will also introduce some realism and proportion into public debate. If so, this may prove to be of more lasting importance than the relatively minor changes to public policy that the commissioner recommends.

Paul Robinson is a professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa and a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy. He is the author of numerous works on Russian and Soviet history, including Russian Conservatism, published by Northern Illinois University Press in 2019.