Since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, many Western commentators have spoken of Russia’s apparently waning influence in the five Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The willingness of Central Asian leaders to court investment from Russia, China, and the West simultaneously is taken as evidence of Moscow’s declining role in the region—at the same time, somewhat paradoxically, US commentators are frustrated with Central Asia’s continued economic relations with Russia and the ways in which these relations continue to deepen. A recent article in Foreign Policy magazine with the admonishing title of “The Stans Can’t Play Both Sides Anymore” conveys the US attitude on this question.

In late February 2023, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken traveled to Central Asia for the purpose of “enhancing economic, energy and environmental, and security cooperation among the United States, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and the Republic of Uzbekistan.” According to long-time Central Asia correspondent Bruce Pannier, Blinken’s message to the region’s leaders essentially amounted to “Less Russia, not too much China.”

Richard Hoagland, former ambassador to Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, asserted that Blinken’s trip was “a welcome reminder to the Central Asian leaders that US foreign policy is paying attention while they grapple with their traditionally dominant partner, Russia, because of [President Vladimir] Putin’s criminal war in Ukraine.” He told Voice of America that “Washington has no desire to supplant Moscow in Central Asia,” but statements from him and other Biden administration officials frequently invoke Putin’s Russia.

Assistant Secretary of State Donald Lu, who joined Blinken on the trip, has stated that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has caused “high food and fuel prices, high unemployment, difficulty in exporting their goods, slow post-COVID recovery, and a large influx of migrants from Russia” and said that the US is “working to support people in the region.” Of course, the negative effects Lu describes were also exacerbated by Western sanctions on Russia, which have indirectly impacted Central Asian populations.

Given that US foreign policy is dominated by an obsession with countering Russian- and Chinese-led economic integration initiatives, it is difficult to read Washington’s increased engagement with Central Asia as anything but an effort to contain Moscow and Beijing, which have similarly upped their investments in the region in recent years.

It is common to hear that Russian influence in Central Asia is waning, but as Foreign Policy contributors Raffaello Pantucci and Alessandro Arduino explain, this certainly doesn’t look like the truth:

Money flows from Russia into the region have increased. More companies are moving to the region, as foreign and Russian entities and men seeking to escape the Kremlin’s mobilization drive and find an accommodating environment in Central Asia. The Russian government has also leaned heavily into its relationship with the region, with Russian President Vladimir Putin visiting all five countries and sending numerous high-level delegations to seek business links and opportunities. New schools, equipment, aid, and general rhetorical support have also flowed from Moscow.

Nobody, however, would claim that Beijing’s influence in Central Asia is dwindling. President Xi Jinping has long viewed Central Asia as a key region in his global economic agenda—for instance, Xi first announced the creation of the Belt and Road Initiative on a state visit to Kazakhstan in 2013.

Over the past few years, Chinese investments in the region have grown, including a highly important China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway which Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov recently described as “of a particular importance” to the “connectivity of our region.” The US government has certainly not proposed a project in Central Asia as regionally significant as this one.

On top of that, a recent meeting in Xi’an, China between President Xi Jinping and the five Central Asian leaders underscored increasing economic ties. In Xi’an, China and Kazakhstan signed 23 bilateral agreements; China and Uzbekistan signed 41; China and Kyrgyzstan signed 25; China and Tajikistan signed 25; and China and Turkmenistan signed at least six, a smaller number, but still significant when one recalls that the two countries signed 15 agreements in January of this year.

The Xi’an summit also resulted in the release of the Xi’an Declaration, a 15-point statement that stresses the importance of the Belt and Road Initiative, security collaboration, political stability, the “huge potential for trade and economic cooperation between the states of Central Asia and China,” and more.

At the summit, President Xi declared that China is “ready to coordinate development strategies with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and promote the modernization of all.” Of particular interest to China is increased energy cooperation and transport infrastructure—a new and improved trade infrastructure connecting the Chinese and Central Asian economies even more deeply. This ambitious framework dwarfs promises from the US.

“[T]he issue of connectivity was the one topic that received the greatest attention at the Xi’an summit,” reported former Indian diplomat M.K. Bhadrakumar, “which involves improving the transport infrastructure along the China–Central Asia and China–Europe routes through Central Asia, as well as increasing the capacity of border checkpoints, all of which aim to create conditions for increasing cargo and passenger traffic.”

At the same time that both Russia and China are upping their individual engagement with Central Asia, they are also negotiating new platforms to coordinate and synthesize their investments in the region, specifically through a proposed organization called “5+2.” As the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta recently reported, “a new ‘5+2’ axis is being formed (Central Asia plus China and Russia),” a platform which Bhadrakumar writes:

will have its own mechanisms and projections, which differ from the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) or the Belt and Road Initiative and the Eurasian Economic Union community… Currently, there are no agreed common strategies in the Central Asian region, which has a population of 75 million. The Belt and Road project does not adequately take into account the interests of Russia and the interface with the Eurasian Economic Union projects cannot provide a sufficient level of interaction either, due to systemic weaknesses.

Assuming 5+2 goes forward, it will mark a new era of joint Russian-Chinese engagement in the region.

Some in the US are seeking to offset the growing Chinese role in the region. An article by Atlantic Council members Andrew D’Anieri and John E. Herbst (who served as a US ambassador to Uzbekistan under George W. Bush) claims that China is “dangerous as a potential hegemon” in Central Asia and that “it would be naïve for Washington and its allies and partners—which rightly see China as the greatest long-term threat to their security—to cede the Central Asian steppe to Beijing.”

The authors write: “Washington should seek ways to energize economic cooperation but also help find clearly defined security solutions in Central Asian countries. At the same time, the United States should work with the EU, South Korea, and Japan to enhance opportunities for Central Asia to work with the democratic world.” This will prove difficult, however, given the fact that “US trade with the region was just below $3.5 billion in 2022, roughly one tenth the amount for both Russia and China.”

Ultimately, the authors claim that Central Asia “cannot count on” China being a “reliable, peaceful partner,” but they can count on this from the US. Given these countries’ proximity to Afghanistan (where the US waged war for 20 years) and Iran (which the US has sought to destabilize for over 40 years for going against Washington’s global agenda), it is laughable to think that Central Asian leaders would take at face value the US’s promise to be a more reliable and peaceful partner than Beijing.

As many geopolitical analysts have written, we are in an era of multipolarity characterized by the increased assertiveness of Washington’s geopolitical foes—mainly Russia and China—whose economic and military moves are undermining US global hegemony in profound ways. Former US Defense Secretary James Mattis described this era as one of “great-power competition.” In this era, the US has identified Central Asia as an area of increased interest and, despite its public statements to the contrary, is treating it as another region where Chinese and Russian power should be challenged. Given the growing economic engagement between the countries, as well as their deep historic and sociocultural ties, the likelihood of this strategy succeeding is next to nil.

Owen Schalk is a writer from Manitoba. His book on Canada’s role in the war in Afghanistan will be released by Lorimer in September. You can preorder it here. To see more of his work, visit www.owenschalk.com.