Articles
Labour, Web ExclusiveSetting the Record Straight
- NOTE: This article is the continuation of an exchange between two actors in the recent York University Strike. This debate took place in the May/June 2009 issue of Canadian Dimension. To view the online version of this debate, please consider reading our editorial and the subsequent articles by Tyler Shipley and Tyler McCreary.
Tyler McCreary’s Tough Union, Tough Lessons would be a useful contribution to the important post-mortem of a strike ended wrong, if not for the fact that most of the evidence upon which his arguments are premised bears little resemblance whatsoever to the historical record.
McCreary argues that support from other sections of the labour movement was “lukewarm” and that this was a result of “self-aggrandizement and disdain for working with other unions” among Union leaders. Unfortunately, facts stand in the way of McCreary’s story: CUPE 3903 received well over $100,000 in support from over 125 different labour and community organizations across the country and the world, as documented in the treasurer’s end-of-year report. CUPE 3903 held a demonstration in downtown Toronto protesting the casualization of labour in all sectors in Ontario on Dec. 3, 2008, and dozens of unions and organizations from across the province sent people to bolster our numbers, culminating in a rally of hundreds of people that drew media attention to some of the most crucial issues at the heart of the strike. There are plenty of photographs showing all of the different flags flying in support of our action on that day and at others throughout the strike. Naturally, there is always room for improvement, and if McCreary had joined the efforts of other members to build upon our community support, he would have discovered just how happy the leadership was to give full cooperation with those efforts.
McCreary goes on to claim that the leadership of the Union “neglected the importance of regular representation of the membership in committees,” a suggestion that eschews even the simplest logic. Every committee in the Union is made up of members and there were upwards of 20 active committees operating in the strike encompassing hundreds of different members in various decision-making capacities. These committees’ responsibilities ranged from managing food and coffee for picketers to internal and external communications to liaising with allies in the labour movement to organizing phone trees and email lists. Among the many examples of members’ contributions to the strike are the brilliant mock-ads created by the video committee and circulated online. Arguably the most important committee in terms of day-to-day direction of the strike was the strike committee, which met nearly every day at staggered times and locations, and which solicited at least two representatives from each picket line – elected by those on the lines that day – and which made most of the significant decisions relating to strike and picket strategy.
McCreary further suggests that “leading members gleamed with revolutionary ardour…motivated by the dream of a general strike.” While this certainly reflects the mischaracterization offered by York’s administration and parroted by the Right in the Union in their efforts to de-legitimize the leadership, it offers nothing by way of concrete analysis. Indeed, if McCreary himself had spent more time participating in the meetings he claims didn’t happen, he might know that neither “revolution” nor “general strikes” were ever even mentioned. I invite him, as a member with access to the minutes of all meetings, to back up his claim by pointing to the moments where “the dream of a general strike” was inculcated into any of the decisions made during the strike.
While McCreary produces no shortage of fiery assertions and accusations to level at the leadership of the strike, he provides very little evidence to back up any of his claims. Mistakes were made during the strike, naturally, and a discussion of those mistakes is an important part of planning for future rounds of struggle. After reading McCreary’s piece, it seems clear to me that the post-strike discussions will need to include reflection on the mischaracterizations promoted by the Employer and the mainstream media and repeated uncritically by observers like McCreary.
While McCreary is not incorrect in noting that the climate and context of the recent CUPE 3903 strike was different from that of 2000-01, he fails to produce any sort of program for how the Union might have responded differently; following McCreary’s argument, presumably, CUPE 3903 should not have gone on strike at all since the climate in Ontario is less conducive to labour struggles at the moment. If that is, indeed, his claim then I can only reply that I, along with the thousands of members who first voted to go on strike and then voted again to remain on strike, disagree with that sort of defeatism.
Without any evidence to back it up, McCreary claims that 3903 leaders were arrogant vanguardists bent on revolution and out of touch with reality. York’s President Shoukri couldn’t have said it better, though he tried: immediately following the forced ratification vote in which thousands of members rejected the university’s offer, he spoke directly to 3903 members through the media, saying “your Union leaders have misled you… we have nothing left to offer and we will not be returning to the bargaining table.” This is not an uncommon management tactic – does McCreary think Union leaders should have gone against the will of an overwhelming majority of the membership and thrown in the towel? As it happened, the next step for CUPE 3903 was to significantly slash our demands in an effort to bring the strike to an end – hardly the basis for general strike or revolution.
Reflecting on the successes and failures of the strike is important, provided that the conversation is based upon the realities of CUPE 3903’s experience, rather than the anti-strike rhetoric that emerged in reaction to it. I engage with that discussion in my recent piece Demanding the Impossible: The Future of Struggle in Post-Secondary Education and would encourage Tyler McCreary to reconsider his analysis in light of the facts and contribute in a more productive way to the project of preparing for future rounds of struggle.
But what about McCreary’s comments regarding the 2010 strategy? He says “failing to prioritize participation in coordinated bargaining, CUPE 3903 made its most crucial error”.
You have ignored the wider implications of the strike for other campus-based locals in the province, especially those participating in and banking on the 2010 coordinated bargaining strategy to help secure better conditions and wages and move towards sector-wide standards as well as sector-wide bargaining like OPSEU has in the provincial college system.
That you have ignored this particular criticism in your rejoinder only appears to further reinforce McCreary’s point, a point I happen to firmly agree with regardless of whether or not he is correct in his interpretation of 3903’s internal matters. See my comment on McCreary’s article to understand what I mean by the “wider implications”.
#1. Posted by Doug in Peterborough/Ottawa on May 25th 2009 at 12:51pm
Briefly, Doug, thanks for your contribution to this discussion. I’ve read your comments on the other string as well, and while I sympathize with your concern over the fate of the 2010 round of bargaining, I think you are still accepting McCreary’s suggestion that CUPE 3903 did not prioritize the 2010 expiry date, which is simply false.
These discussions are only useful if based in some semblence of reality - the reality is that York adamently and absolutely refused to agree to a two-year contract for our local (to expire in 2010), which is in fact part of the reason we ‘chose’ 2008 for a ‘big push.’ See, I would argue that we didn’t ‘choose’ it at all. If, in September, the Employer had offered a contract that was less-than-satisfactory but that expired in 2010 I think it would have been quite likely that the membership would have accepted it and focused its attention on 2010.
But York refused, knowing full-well that 3903 participation in the 2010 round would be an important factor. The province, naturally, knew this too. As such, if we had not ‘pushed’ this time around, we would have had no chance of landing a two-year contract. This was a major consideration when the local voted to go on strike, and it remained central to our bargaining priorities. The fact that we were legislated back to work may, in fact, be a result of our refusal to drop the demand for a two-year contract (though my personal opinion is that it didn’t matter what we did at the table, the Employer’s strategy did not seem to involve bargaining with the Union at any point.)
It is worth emphasizing that the demand for a two-year contract was actually never taken off the table, even in the last desperate days of the strike. The 2010 expiry date was affirmed by the membership at a GMM in October and remained on the table as one of the ‘priorities’ throughout. By the end of the strike, we had removed our wage demands entirely, we had drastically reduced our other monetary demands, and our entire proposal package had been cut back to the bare minimum: even then, it still insisted upon a two-year contract.
How this amounts to “failing to prioritize participation in coordinated bargaining” is something only Tyler McCreary can explain, since he is the one who made the statement. In light of the above, it seems to me a patently absurd and outlandish claim, which I hope explains my negligence in failing to respond directly to that point in my initial rejoinder.
Very sincerely,
Tyler Shipley
CUPE 3903
#2. Posted by Tyler Shipley in Toronto, ON on May 28th 2009 at 4:11pm