Defense and Military Education: A Dimension of Chinese Power (Loro Horta)
From: “PINR Dispatch” dispatch@pinr.com
Date: September 28, 2006
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“PINR Dispatch” dispatch@pinr.com September 28, 2006
The National Defense University (N.D.U.) of the People’s Liberation Army (P.L.A.) is China’s foremost military education institution. An average of 1,000 Chinese officers graduate every year in diverse fields of study. For many years after its founding in 1984, the N.D.U. has been relatively unknown to the outside world, with very few foreign officers being allowed to attend the more advanced courses.
Those who were accepted came primarily from countries perceived to be friendly to China such as Cuba, North Korea and various other third world states that usually had poor relations with the West. The very few Western officers who attended the N.D.U. were usually confined to short symposium type courses with very little of substance being offered.
Until recently, the N.D.U. was a very closed and discrete club, open only to China’s military elites and its foreign “friends.” To this day, the N.D.U. does not host a website where prospective students could obtain the most basic information about the university. Information is provided to future students directly by the Chinese military attaché in their respective countries, with students only gaining access to the school’s site a few days after enrollment.
Despite these restrictions, the N.D.U., just like China, has been fast opening up to the world. From a very limited number of foreign students, the N.D.U. today graduates an average of 400 foreign officers every year. Military officers and senior civilian officials from more than 100 countries have graduated from its various courses.
Three main courses are open to foreign officers: the one year Defense and Strategy Course for senior military officers; the one year High Command Course; and the recently inaugurated Joint Command Course. Attesting to the N.D.U.’s increasing global outlook, the above mentioned courses are available in the following major languages: English, Spanish, French and Russian, with courses in the different languages being held simultaneously or alternatively.
In addition, various shorter courses are also available, such as the Young and Mid-Ranking Officer Course and the 45-day International Security Symposium. In order to carry out such an extensive and multilingual academic program, the university possesses a large number of competent interpreters, usually recently gradated P.L.A. cadets, for simultaneous translations. Lectures are generally fluent in the respective languages of the course in which they are allocated, although by rule the instructors lecture in Chinese and make use of interpreters.
The N.D.U. possesses quite modern facilities with both single and married officers’ apartment blocks, fully furnished and equipped with air conditioning, a central heating system, cable TV and the latest model of China’s most advanced computer, the Lenovo. A gym and other sports facilities are also available, and these facilities are always decorated by pictures of China’s military products, perhaps in the hope of attracting some prospective buyers.
A series of visits to China’s major historical sites are organized for the foreign students, in addition to visits to P.L.A. military facilities and industrial complexes such as its main arms corporation, the NORINCO Group. Visits to various locations outside Beijing are also organized, with Shanghai and the Three Gorges Dam the most popular among students.
Building Soft Power
Various factors are behind the opening of the N.D.U. and P.L.A. schools in general to the outside world. As mentioned above, China has been opening up to the world for nearly three decades, and the opening of its academies is but a natural part of this progression.
Second, Beijing feels the need to replicate to the largest extent possible the well established and far-reaching U.S. education and training programs that have allowed the United States to maintain strong links with various militaries around the world. These programs not only allowed Washington to develop close relations between its officers and their counterparts around the world, but to facilitate issues such as basing, arms sales, joint operations and alliance maintenance. China is increasingly realizing that mere weapons sales are not enough to secure its influence. It is, therefore, beginning to engage in a similar global military education program with an aim to train and influence the leaders of the countries where it has its interests
Third, today China possesses far more resources than it ever did in the past. This allows it to host such programs. Making use of its newfound wealth, China is working to build up its reputation and prestige as a center of military excellence among the world’s militaries. The hope is that as the country’s resources grow, China will be able to successfully replicate the large U.S. educational network and compete for the preferences of the world’s militaries. Prestige is definitely an important factor, with some visits being clearly designed to impress the guests. Therefore, China’s aim is to augment its soft power among the world’s militaries, while at the same time reducing the soft power of the United States and its allies.
The Results
China’s military education programs have given Beijing some tangible benefits with many of its graduates assuming senior positions in their respective countries. Among them is President Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo, in addition to a few chiefs of staff and cabinet ministers in Africa and Asia. While most countries still send their very best, the chief of staff material, to Western academies, many officers reaching less senior positions such as one star and two star generals are increasingly being trained in China.
All armies in Africa and a few in Latin America and Southeast Asia have N.D.U. graduates at the ranking of colonel or brigadier. In countries such as Nigeria, Poland, Nepal and Indonesia, the Defense and Strategy Course has become a promotion course, while in Indonesia it is also being use to compensate for the decrease in interaction with the American and Australian militaries and for the lack of vacancies at the country’s top strategy school.
China is also assuming a major role in regions where the U.S. presence has been curtailed by domestic politics, such as in the cases of South America and some parts of the Middle East. From Venezuela alone, an estimated 30 officers have graduated from various P.L.A. academies in recent years.
The United States, however, is not alone; some of its major allies such as Australia are in a similar predicament. Canberra’s relations with two of A.S.E.A.N.’s most important members, Indonesia and Malaysia, have been “complex,” to say the least. In the case of Indonesia, relations are now at their lowest since 1999 when Australia led an international effort that culminated in the independence and separation of East Timor. As a result, the number of officers from these countries reaching Australian schools has diminished, while the numbers reaching P.L.A. institutions has increased.
To complicate matters further, the U.S. position as a defense and military education provider in Southeast Asia is not much better. Despite the partial restoration of military ties early this year, the American-Indonesian military relationship remains fragile and is plagued by strong suspicions on the part of Jakarta.
The United States still maintains its role as the major defense and military education provider in countries such as Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore. The Chinese option has been growing, particularly in Thailand, although more as a result of economic and political reasons rather than academic excellence, with most Thai officers still preferring to go to the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia.
China’s role as a defense education provider has also been on the rise in South Asia, a region traditionally dominated by India. The rise of anti-Indian sentiment in Bangladesh, coupled with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, has led the Bangladeshi government to seek closer ties with China. In the past few years, literally hundreds of Bangladeshi officers graduated from various P.L.A. education institutions. China is currently the main supplier of weapons to its armed forces, supplying it with frigates, fighter jets, tanks, armored personal carriers and other equipment sold at “friendship prices.”
Beijing’s influence has also increased in Nepal, where decades-old resentment over alleged Indian colonial attitudes has paved the way for greater cooperation with the P.L.A. Last year alone, some 20 Nepalese officers graduated from Chinese military schools.
In South Asia, just like in Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Middle East, the emergence of a political atmosphere unfavorable to the traditionally dominant powers in these regions has allowed China to increase its influence in ways that may not otherwise have been possible. It remains to be seen if China’s rising position will be able to survive political change of the very same nature that brought Beijing into the picture.
The rise of China’s military education programs and its increasing global reach comes at a time when U.S. military education programs are contracting. For instance, of the four regional centers run by the American N.D.U., only two — the Asia Pacific Center for Strategic Studies based in Hawaii and the George C. Marshall Center for European Security in Germany — are properly funded. While it makes sense for the United States to invest more resources in Asia and Europe due to these regions’ obvious importance, the neglect of Latin America and Africa in a period when China is devoting greater attention to these regions is short-sighted. As noted by a seasoned Latin American observer: “The United States runs the risk of losing contact with an entire generation of Latin American officers who one day will be in positions of great importance.”
This is not to suggest, however, that China or the P.L.A. have some grand design to undermine U.S. interests in this area. Rather, China is acting within its state interests by taking advantage of a series of international and domestic circumstances that happen to be unfavorable to the United States in order to maximize its gains.
Conclusion
While China’s top military institutions have improved both in terms of sophistication and scope, they still face serious problems. Even the N.D.U., the country’s top military institution, has faced problems of poor and inconsistent curriculums and some material deficiencies such as poor libraries and poor audio visual facilities, particularly those for foreign officer courses. A sign of such a weakness has been the N.D.U.’S inability to have its Defense and Strategy Course awarded the level of master due to resistance from civilian universities over its alleged poor curriculum.
Despite these problems, China’s military schools have seen an impressive renaissance with more attention being dedicated to the study of the military arts instead of the dry ideological tirades of the past. Its facilities are improving year by year, with various officers from developed countries expressing their surprise at the good conditions they encounter. While lagging behind U.S. academies in areas such as academic excellence, modern curriculum and teaching facilities, Chinese military schools are fast catching up and presenting themselves as credible alternatives for the world’s military elites. This works to China’s advantage by expanding its military influence and soft power capabilities.
Report Drafted By: Loro Horta
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